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I

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a final order of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District denying Appellant Christine Barrus
(hereinafter "Barrus") relief, following de novo review of an
informal

adjudicative

Department

of

Human

proceeding
Services.

before
The

the

Court

State
of

of

Appeals

Utah,
has

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953),
as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the court erred in not finding that Barrus'

caseworker made a representation regarding Barrus' eligibility for
AFDC upon which Barrus relied to her detriment. R-273.
2.

Whether the district court erred in failing to apply the

doctrine of equitable estoppel so as to estop the State of Utah,
Department of Human Services from declaring Barrus ineligible for
AFDC benefits. R-193.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to findings of fact require the appellant to
marshall the evidence in support of the findings and to demonstrate
why the evidence is insufficient or why the contested finding is
clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Trolley Square

Associates v. Nelson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994).

The

application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable
estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law.

Since equitable

estoppel is a highly fact dependent question, the trial court's
application of equitable estoppel will not be overturned absent an
1

abuse of discretion. Trolley Square. 886 P.2d at 65; State of Utah
v. Irizarrv, 893 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah App. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES#
ORDINANCES AND RULES
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(1991 ed. and Supp.)
Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II §§ 122 and 438
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case

This case began at the administrative level when Barrus
received

a

notice

from

her

caseworker,

Shannon

Freestone

(hereinafter "Freestone") of the Ogden Office of Family Support
(OFS), dated July 6, 1994, advising that her financial and medical
assistance case would be closed July 31, 1994. Record (hereinafter
"R"), at 168.
Dependent

Barrus had been receiving Aid to Families with

Children

(AFDC) and Medicaid

for

herself

and

her

stepchildren. The notice advised that her case would remain closed
through August 31, 1994, because she had received a lump sum
payment of $2226.00 in June 1994, placing her over the income limit
for a household of her size. R-168.
Barrus requested a hearing on July 8, 1994. R-171. A hearing
in Barrus' case was held August 14, 1994 before Hearing Officer
Neal Bernson.

R-6.

At the hearing, it was established that the

lump sum was retroactive Social Security benefits which Barrus
received in June 1994.

R-6.

The state applied its policies at

Volume II S 438 to disqualify Barrus and her family. That section
of the AFDC policies disqualifies participating
2

families who

receive a nonrecurring payment of income which exceeds the standard
needs amount for the household.

R-6-10. Barrus testified she had

reported to her caseworker in May 1994 that she had been found
disabled and had given her a copy of the favorable decision. R-ll.
She argued that her caseworker had failed to advise her that
receipt of a lump sum would disqualify her and that she had relied
on her caseworker to inform her.

She argued that the doctrine of

equitable estoppel should be applied to prevent her case from being
closed.

R-ll.

In a decision dated November 4, 1994, the hearing

officer denied Barrus the relief she requested.

R-5. Barrus then

filed her complaint in the district court, seeking review of the
informal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to

Utah Code Annot. §

63-46b-15.
B.

Course Of The Proceedings

Upon completion of discovery, a trial de novo was held in the
district court on January 23, 1996 before the Honorable Stanton M.
Taylor.

The parties presented evidence and trial memoranda.

On

February 8, 1996, Judge Taylor issued a memorandum decision denying
Barrus relief from the informal adjudicative proceeding.

This

appeal followed.
C.

Disposition At Trial Court Or Agency

The relief requested pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-15
(1991) was denied.
D.

Relevant Facts With Citations To The Record

In January 1994, Barrus applied for financial and medical
assistance at the Ogden Office of Family Support (OFS).
3

R-202,

229.

In April

Medicaid

1994, Barrus was receiving AFDC benefits and

for herself and four stepchildren.

R-197. At the same

time, she had pending applications for Social Security Disability
Insurance (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).1 When she
applied for disability, Barrus did not understand the difference
between the two programs.

R-198.

Barrus suffers from lupus

erythematosus which, in addition to physical symptoms, affects her
intellectual functioning.

R-199.

Barrus' caseworker was Shannon Freestone.

R-201.

She has a

bachelor's degree and two years of graduate school. R-239. At the
time of trial she had been employed by OFS for two and one-half
years.

R-228.

She had received intensive training during her

first six months and continual training thereafter.

R-228-29.

Freestone was familiar with the lump sum policy contained in Vol.
II § 438.
about

once

R-172.

She was "generally given training on lump sums

a year, plus

it's mentioned

informally

in other

trainings." R-229. The essence of Freestone's training as to lump
sums was "not to tell the clients to spend their money."

R-244.

The policy and practice at OFS allows a worker to consult with
a more experienced worker when the correct application of a policy
is not known.

R-242.

From January 1994 through July 1994,

Freestone knew that if the lump sum Barrus would receive was SSI
benefits, it would not affect her family's AFDC and Medicaid
Recipients and others sometimes refer to the Disability
Insurance Program as "SSA" to distinguish it from Supplemental
Security Income "SSI."
Since SSA is also the acronym for the
Social Security Administration, the Disability Insurance Program
will be referred to herein as DIB.
4

eligibility but if the lump sum were DIB benefits, eligibility
would be affected.

R-244-46.

Freestone never discussed with

Barrus how receipt of a DIB lump sum would affect her family's
eligibility (R-246-47), although there is no policy that would
prevent a caseworker from explaining to an AFDC recipient how SSI
and DIB lump sums affect eligibility.

R-246-47.

Freestone could

have told Barrus not to spend any lump sum she received until it
was determined how her children's eligibility would be affected,
but she did not do so. R-248. Had Barrus told Freestone that she
was receiving a $10,000.00 inheritance next month, her caseworker
would have advised her how such a lump sum would affect her future
eligibility.

R-248.

Part of a caseworker's duty is to determine

eligibility.

R-249.

Freestone did not determine Barrus' future

eligibility until after the lump sum had been received and spent.
R-249.
When she applied for assistance in January 1994, Barrus
indicated on her application that she had applied for Social
Security and gave her caseworker copies of both her DIB and SSI
applications.

R-201-02, 230.

A hearing on Barrus' disability

claim was held April 6, 1994 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
Rand Farrer.

R-164, 167. Barrus' representative advised Shannon

Freestone in a letter dated April 25, 1994 of the hearing and that,
"[w]e were told by Judge Farrer that he would be awarding benefits
in her favor."
the letter.

R-164.

Shannon Freestone has admitted receiving

R-231.

In a Notice of Decision, dated May 24, 1996, Barrus was
5

advised by SSA that she had been found disabled.

R-165.

On May

26, 1994, Barrus delivered a copy of her favorable disability
decision to her caseworker who date-stamped the document and placed
it in her file.

R-165, 231-32. The Notice of Decision provides,

in part:
DECISION
Based on the Title II application filed on May 14, 1993,
the claimant is entitled to a period of disability
commencing February 15, 1993, and to disability insurance
benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social
Security Act, respectively, and the claimant's disability
has continued through the date of this decision.
It is the further decision of the Administrative Law
Judge that based on the Title XVI application filed on
May 14, 1993, the claimant has been disabled since
February 15, 1993, under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the
Social Security Act, and the claimant's disability has
continued through the date of this decision.
R-166.

When she read the Notice of Decision, Barrus did not

understand the difference between DIB and SSI.

R-207.

Sometime

after delivering a copy of the Notice of Decision to Shannon
Freestone,

Barrus

met

with

her

to

discuss

the

disability

determination. R-209. Following the meeting with her caseworker,
Barrus did not understand the difference between DIB and SSI, nor
did she understand that the receipt of a DIB lump sum would
disqualify her children from AFDC and Medicaid for a period of
time.

R-210-12.

On June 28, 1994, Barrus delivered to her

caseworker a copy of a notice from SSA, dated June 23, 1994 (R-75,
233), which stated, in relevant part:
In an earlier letter, we told you we were
holding back your Social Security benefits for
August 1993 through May 1994. We did this
because we thought we might have to reduce
6

your Social Security benefits if you also got
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) money for
any of those months.
Now we're writing to let you know that we're
sending you the money we held back. This is
because you didn't get SSI money for August
1993 through May 1994.
You'll get a check soon for $2,226.00, the
amount you're due for August 1993 through May
1994.
About July 03, 1994, you'll get your regular
monthly Social Security check for $225.00.
R-169. Toward the end of June 1994, Barrus received $2226.00 as a
lump svim payment of retroactive DIB benefits which she spent on
family necessities.

R-213-15.

On June 28, 1994, Freestone

contacted the Social Security Administration to determine the type
of benefits Barrus would be receiving and was advised that it would
be DIB.

R-72.

On June 30, 1994, Shannon Freestone sent Barrus a

notice requesting additional information:
CHRISTINE, THANKS FOR TURNING IN YOUR SOCIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION.
THERE ARE A FEW MORE
DETAILS I NEED TO KNOW THAT WEREN'T ADDRESSED
IN THE AWARD NOTICE.
PLEASE CONTACT ME CONCERNING WHEN YOU WILL BE
RECEIVING THE $2226 AND HOW MUCH OF THAT
AMOUNT YOU WILL ACTUALLY RECEIVE. I CAN BE
REACHED AT 626-3376.
R-170, 235-36. When Barrus responded to her caseworker's request,
she had already spent all of the lump sum except approximately
$200.

R-236.

In a decision, dated July 6, 1994, Barrus was informed by her
caseworker that her case would be closed from June 1, 1994 through
August 31, 1994, because of the lump sum she received in June. R7

168.

Barrus requested a hearing and received continued benefits

while her case was pending. R-218. The hearing officer who heard
her case denied relief and an overpayment was assessed for the
three months in question. R-218.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A representation was made to Barrus by her caseworker's
silence, when she should have informed her that receipt of a DIB
lump sum would render her children ineligible for several months
from receiving AFDC and medical benefits.

Barrus provided her

caseworker with timely and accurate information regarding her
disability application but was led to believe that she could spend
any lump sum she might receive without it affecting her children's
eligibility.
silence,

She relied to her detriment on her caseworker's

since

had

she

known

of

the

impending

period

of

ineligibility, she would not have spent all of the lump sum but
would have kept most of it for her children's needs.

Under the

circumstances, it would be a manifest injustice to not estop the
state

from

repudiating

its representation

that

Barrus' AFDC

eligibility would not be affected by receipt of the DIB lump sum.
Government functioning would not be impaired, since the state is in
the best position to prevent such mistakes from occurring.
ARGUMENT
I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

Overview of the AFDC Program
The AFDC

program

is based

on

a

scheme

of

cooperative

federalism and is designed to provide financial assistance to

8

needy, dependent children and the parents or relatives who live
with and care for them.
L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968).

Kino v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309f 316, 20

A purpose of the AFDC statute, as expressed

by Congress, is:
...to help maintain and strengthen family life
and to help such parents or relatives to
attain or retain capability for the maximum
self-support
and
personal
independence
consistent with the maintenance of continuing
parental care and protection...
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1991).

A state that participates in the AFDC

program is reimbursed by the federal government for a portion of
the funds it expends.
receiving

federal

42 U.S.C. § 603 (1991).

financial

participation,

In return for

the

state

must

administer its AFDC program pursuant to a state plan that conforms
to the applicable federal statutes and regulations.

42 U.S.C. §

602 (1991). Children found eligible for AFDC are also eligible for
health

benefits

1396a(a)(10)(A).

under

the

Medicaid

program.

States must consider a family's

42

U.S.C. §

"income and

resources" when determining whether or not it is needy.

42 U.S.C.

S 602(a)(7)(A)(1991). A state may not provide AFDC benefits for
any month in which a family's income exceeds a prescribed amount.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(1991).
B.

The Lump Sum Rule
The AFDC lump sum rule at issue in this case was added by

section 402(a) (17) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA).

42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (17) (1991) .

statement of the statute.

See Addendum for full

In sum, the lump sum rule applies when

an AFDC family member receives in a month a lump sum of non9

recurring income which, together with the family's other income,
exceeds the state's standard of need for that family for that
month. The lump sum rule applies to both earned and unearned
income. The period of ineligibility is determined by dividing the
amount of income received in the month by the standard of need for
the household.

Thus, in this case, the state divided $2226—the

amount of DIB benefits Barrus received—by the standard of need for
her

household

size—$810—resulting

ineligible for three months.

in

her

family

becoming

R-ll, 168.

Since the lump sum rule is applied differently to DIB and SSI
benefits, it is important to understand the difference between
these two programs.

A person seeking federal disability will

frequently file for DIB under Title II of the Social Security Act
(sections 216(i) and 223) 42 U.S.C. § 423 and for SSI under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act (section 1614(a)(3)(A)) 42 U.S.C. §
1382.

A person who has worked and paid into the Social Security

system is entitled to DIB, provided the disability has its onset
during the time of insured status. A person who is not insured for
DIB purposes, but is disabled, can be found eligible for SSI.
Retroactive Social Security DIB benefits accrued during the
pendency of a disability
income.

application are considered

unearned

The AFDC lump sum rule applies to DIB and if a member of

an AFDC family receives retroactive DIB, the family will likely be
ineligible for AFDC for a period of time.

In contrast, the lump

sum rule does not apply to a payment of retroactive SSI benefits,
since the federal statute prohibits states from counting an SSI
10

recipient's income or resources as income to a family receiving
AFDC or from considering the SSI recipient as a member of the AFDC
family

for

determining

AFDC

eligibility.

42

U.S.C.

§

602(a)(24)(1991); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(x). When an AFDC family
member receives an award of retroactive SSI, that member is simply
excluded from the eligibility determination and the remaining
members continue to be eligible for AFDC and Medicaid.
II.
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A REPRESENTATION UPON
WHICH BARRUS RELIED TO HER DETRIMENT
Elements of Equitable Estoppel
Estoppel is well-established in Utah case law as a doctrine of

equity designed to give relief to a party who has been led to take
a course of action and suffered some harm as a result of another
party's representation that turns out to be false. This court has
summarized the elements of estoppel as follows:
(1) a statement, admission, act or failure to
act by one party inconsistent with a claim
later asserted;
(2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act or failure to act;
and
(3) injury to the second party that would
result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act.
Eldridae v. Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah
App. 1990).

It is clear that the first element may be established

by proof of an express representation or by silence when a party
ought to speak but does not, either intentionally or through
culpable negligence. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695,
11

697 (Utah 1976).

An early decision summarized:

It is generally held that in order for
silence to work an estoppel, there must be a
legal duty to speak, or there must be
something willful or culpable in the silence
which allows another to place himself in an
unfavorable position by reason thereof.
Utah State Building Comm. v. Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d
763, 772 (Utah 1943).
When it reviewed Barrus' case at the trial de novo, the lower
court failed to consider whether the first element of estoppel was
met by caseworker Freestone's silence.

The memorandum decision

shows that the lower court focused solely on whether an express
representation was made:
The legal theory upon which the petitioner's
claim is based is one of equitable estoppel.
Under that doctrine she must prove that the
statement was made, that she reasonably relied
upon it, that an injury resulted, that
manifest injustice would result if not
remedied, and that the remedy would not impair
the function of government.
The failure of the petitioner's case is based
upon the court's finding that the evidence
failed to preponderate (let alone meet a
standard of clear and convincing evidence as
required by applicable case law) on the issue
of whether or not the proported [sic]
statement was made by Ms. Freestone (the AFDC
caseworker).
R-176.

The lower court found:
2) The basis of the petitioner's claim for
payment from the state is a statement
allegedly made to her by her caseworker that
the social security payment would not affect
her ongoing AFDC assistance.
3)
Petitioner's allegation is that, based
upon the caseworker's representation, she
spent the lump sum payment.
She and her
12

children were injured by closure of her AFDC
case.
4) Petitioner probably asked about the effect
of her SSI award lump sum, not recognizing the
difference between such an award and the SSA
award•
5)
The caseworker most likely responded
correctly to a question about the SSI award's
effect on petitioner's case, and could not
have been reasonably expected to know that the
award actually to be made was something
different.
R-179.
The lower court erred in not finding that the first element of
equitable estoppel was satisfied by the caseworker's silence in
failing to apprise Barrus of how the receipt of a lump sum would
affect her future eligibility. The caseworker had a responsibility
to determine, and redetermine, eligibility for AFDC participants at
the time Barrus first received notice of a possible future lump
sum.

The OFS policy and procedures manual provided, in relevant

part:
Eligibility Workers
1.

Roles:
Determine eligibility for temporary and
appropriate benefits accurately and
timely; select from a wide variety of
programs those necessary to support
clients in their efforts to become self
sufficient.

2•

Responsibilities

B.

Provide information so each client
can make informed decisions.
13

C.

Determine with the client which
programs are applicable to her
circumstances.

•• • •

3.

F.

Monitor and redetermine eligibility.

G.

Keep records which document
eligibility and client's movement
toward goals.

Expectations
A.

Use all skills, information/ tools
and resources available to assist
the client.

Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II § 122. See Addendum.
Barrus admits that the evidence does not support a finding
that the caseworker made an express representation upon which she
relied to her detriment.

Although Barrus testified that after

meeting with Freestone she understood that the receipt of a Social
Security lump sum would not affect her children's AFDC eligibility.
Freestone denied giving any advice to Barrus as to how the lump sum
would affect her eligibility.
abundant

evidence

that

R-209-12, 234.

Freestone

remained

However, there is
silent

when

she

reasonably could have determined what the effect of a lump sum
would be on Barrus' eligibility. The caseworker had at least three
opportunities to carry out her responsibility to

"redetermine

eligibility" and to provide Barrus with information so she could
"make informed decisions."
1.

These include:

Barrus' Initial Report of a Favorable Disability Decision
There is no dispute that Barrus provided her caseworker with

a letter, dated 25 April 1994, from G. Barrie Nielson, her legal
14

representative in the Social Security proceeding, advising that the
ALJ who heard the Social Security case would be awarding benefits.
R-164.

There was nothing in state policy which would have

prevented Freestone from contacting Nielson or Social Security to
determine whether the lump sum would be DIB or SSI.

R-250.

Freestone did neither, choosing, instead, to remain silent until
the lump sum arrived.

Freestone's statement that, "We can't tell

them how it will affect their case until the lump sum arrives" is
simply wrong.

R-246.

Freestone admitted as much during cross-

examination:
Q.
Well, you could tell them the difference
between SSI and DIB, couldn't you?
A.

We could.

Q.
And could you not tell them, as you just
testified, that SSI does not affect the
children's eligibility, but that DIB does?
A.

We could tell them that.

Q.
I mean, you wouldn't have to know the
amount to give them that information, would
you?
A.
R-246-47.

No.

At the very least, the state could have advised Barrus

of the effect receipt of a DIB lump sum would have on her
children's eligibility for AFDC; Barrus could have then used this
information to decide whether she wished to spend the money as she
did or hold it in reserve to meet her children's financial and
medical needs•
2.

Barrus' Report of the Actual Favorable Disability Decision
There is again no dispute that upon receiving the actual
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favorable Social Security decision on her disability, Barrus
immediately provided a copy to her caseworker. R-165, 231-32. The
copy of the decision was date-stamped by the Ogden OFS on May 26,
1994, long before the actual lump sum was received by Barrus.
165.

R-

Contained in the favorable decision is the following key

paragraph:
DECISION
Based on the Title II application filed on May
14, 1993, the claimant is entitled to a period
of disability commencing February 15, 1993,
and to disability insurance benefits under
sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security
Act,
respectively,
and
the
claimant's
disability has continued at least through the
date of this decision.
R-166. Freestone testified that when she read the quoted paragraph
in May 1994, it did not give her any indication of the type of
benefits Barrus would be receiving.

R-232.

She assumed it meant

Barrus had been approved for Social Security but did not consult
with a supervisor or other workers. R-253. Most importantly, she
remained silent and did nothing to advise Barrus that the Title II
disability insurance benefits referred to in the decision were the
type of lump sum that would likely disqualify her children from
benefits.
3.

Barrus' Report of Her Award Letter
Throughout her testimony, the caseworker maintained that she

could not advise Barrus as to how a lump sum would affect her
children's eligibility until Barrus received her award letter. R232-34. Barrus did bring in her award letter, dated June 23, 1994,
as requested and it was date-stamped on June 28th or perhaps the
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29th. R-233. The award letter states unequivocally that the lump
sum would not be SSI benefits:
Now we're writing to let you know that we're
sending you the money we held back. This is
because you didn't get SSI money for August
1993 through May 1994.
You'll get a check soon for $2,226.00, the
amount you're due for August 1993 through May
1994.
R-169.

Even with this information, Freestone still remained

silent. Rather than advise Barrus that the soon-to-be-arriving DIB
lump sum would render her children ineligible for June through
August,

Freestone

sent

Barrus

requesting more information.

a note,

R-170.

dated

30

June

1994,

The note contains not a

single reference to the fact that a DIB lump sum will disqualify
Barrus's children for AFDC and Medicaid.

Barrus responded but by

then it was too late: the lump sum had been spent.
next communication

Freestone's

with Barrus was to send her a Notice of

Decision, dated 6 July 1994, telling her the bad news:
Your financial medical assistance case will be
closed July 31. This is because the money you
received as a lump sum payment of $2226.00
puts you over the income limit for your
household size....
Your household will be ineligible for
financial and medical assistance from June 1,
1994 through August 31, 1994.
R-168.

By the time Freestone broke her silence, it was too late

for Barrus to use the information to make an informed decision: she
had already spent the lump sum.
It is clear that despite the official policy quoted above
placing

the

responsibility

on
17

the

caseworker

to

"[p]rovide

information so each client can make informed decisions..." and to
"monitor and redetermine eligibility..." the actual practice is to
remain

silent

eligibility.

as

to

how

a DIB

lump

sum will

affect AFDC

Freestone's testimony shows that during the time

period January through July 1994, she knew that DIB would affect
Barrus' eligibility for AFDC, while an SSI lump sum would not, but
she chose not to inform her of this. R-244-46.
followed a policy of silence.

Instead, Freestone

When asked about her admitted

knowledge regarding lump sums, she testified:
Q.
And did you discuss that with Christine
Barrus at any time?
A.

No, not that I recall.

Q,

Why not?

A.
I didn't have — that's a very complex
policy and generally we don't attempt to
explain that to clients — until it's going to
affect their case.
Q.
So you wait until the lump sum arrives
and then try to sort it out; is that correct?
A.
We can't tell them how it will affect
their case until the lump sum arrives.
R-246. But in many cases, including Barrus', that is too late: the
lump sum arrives and, absent knowledge of how future eligibility
will be affected, is spent on outstanding bills and not kept to
meet future needs.

The caseworker's silence satisfies the first

element for applying equitable estoppel in this case.
III.
A.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

Barrus Reasonably Relied on Her Caseworker's Silence
It was reasonable for Barrus to rely upon her caseworker's
18

silence as a representation that receipt of the DIB lump sum would
not affect her children's eligibility for AFDC.

The record shows

that she did everything she could to keep her caseworker informed
about her pending disability claim.

She met with her caseworker

shortly after delivering a copy of her favorable decision but did
not receive any clear information as to how her future eligibility
would be affected.

R-208-09.

Shannon Freestone was in the best position to know whether
Barrus' eligibility would be affected by a DIB lump sum.

She was

well-educated, having completed a bachelors degree and two years of
graduate school. R-239. She had been trained and had read through
the policy on lump sums.

R-241.

Freestone had a supervisor and

other trained workers with whom she could consult, should she have
difficulty understanding the application of policy.

R-242.

In

contrast, Barrus had no training and did not even understand the
difference between DIB and SSI at the time she applied for
disability or later.

R-198.

Moreover, Barrus suffers from a

disabling condition—systemic erythematosus lupus—and testified
that it causes, among other things, confusion, depression and
altered intellectual functioning.

R-198-99, 223.

circumstances,

for Barrus

it was

reasonable

Given these

to rely on her

caseworker to provide her with accurate information and advise her
of the likely eligibility change.
B.

Barrus Suffered Harm as a Result of Her Caseworker's Silence
Barrus and her family were living on a limited income at the

time her benefits were terminated.
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The AFDC benefit for Barrus'

household was $654.00 plus food stamps.

Her children needed

medical assistance, including weekly counseling sessions costing
$85 per session. R-201. Barrus' husband was not employed when she
received notice of the termination and she had no other means of
assistance while her case was closed.

R-217.

She does not have

the means of repaying the overpaid benefits. R-218. Had she known
that the DIB lump sum would make her children ineligible, Barrus
would have acted differently.

She testified:

A.
I would have paid the rent on our home
and our utilities.
I would have discussed
with my mental health doing a sliding fee
program to keep the children in their
counseling, or set up a payment plan that I
would still be able to carry them.
Q.
Would you have gone out and spent the
money you described on a bed and tires and
other bills?
A.
I may have still done the tires and
insurance because we had to make the trip to
Oregon.

A.
But as far as the bed and any household,
a lot of bills can be put —
Q.
Would you have kept some of that money
for your children's needs?
A.
R-220.

Correct.

In sum, although Barrus spent the lump sum on family

necessities, she would have kept a portion of the lump sum for her
children's financial and medical needs.

Now she is faced with

having to pay back the financial and medical assistance out of her
limited monthly resources, a situation which will only make her
family's living conditions worse.
20

By her silence when she should

have spoken, Barrus's caseworker led her to believe that her
family's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid would not be affected by
receipt of a DIB lump sum.

The state should now be estopped from

contradicting or repudiating its previous representation.
C.

Failure to Apply Estoppel Would Result in Injustice
Although as a general rule equitable estoppel may not be

invoked against governmental entities# there is an exception to
this rule when:
(1) it is necessary
injustice; and

to

prevent

manifest

(2) the exercise of governmental powers will
not be impaired as a result of the application
of estoppel.
Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah
App. 1991). The Court in Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646
P. 2d

715, 718, n.

4

(Utah

1982) observed

that

"courts are

increasingly applying this exception, consistent with the trend
toward holding government and its agencies more responsible for
their actions."

Utah cases which have applied this exception and

found manifest injustice without any impairment of governmental
powers

include

Celebrity

Club,

Inc. v.

Utah

Liquor

Control

Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), wherein the Commission was
estopped from denying a liquor license to an applicant who had
relied on a letter advising that its club facility met statutory
requirements.

The Court emphasized that the petitioner had acted

in good faith in relying on the state's representation.

The same

is true in this case, where Barrus dutifully reported to her
caseworker every time there was a development in her disability
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case. This court found the same good faith reliance in Eldridge v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d at 676, wherein a retiree
received

incorrect

retirement.

information

regarding

the

terms

of

his

The court observed that "the government should be

scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens..." quoting from a
Washington case:
[W]here a public official, acting within his
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent
facts, has made a commitment and the party to
whom it was made has acted to his detriment in
reliance on that commitment, the official
should not be permitted to revoke that
commitment.
State ex. rel. Shannon v. Sponburqh, 401 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1965)
quoted in Eldridge v. Utah State Retirement, 795 P.2d at 676.
A more recent Washington

state case which examined the

applicability of equitable estoppel against a government agency in
a

context

similar

to

that

under

review

in

this

appeal

is

Kramarevckv v. State, DSHS, 822 P.2d 1227 (Wash. App. 1992), aff 'd
863 P.2d 535 (1993). Kramarevcky received a four-month overpayment
when he failed to report his income. The ALJ who heard the appeal
found that Kramarevcky had followed all proper procedures and had
no reason to believe his eligibility had ceased. The ALJ concluded
all the elements of equitable estoppel had been met.

In a related

case consolidated with Kramarevcky, a different ALJ found equitable
estoppel applied where Olivia Jinneman incurred an overpayment due
to the state's error in continuing to provide her with AFDC and
medical coupons after her son reached age 18 and was no longer in
school.

In both cases, the state was estopped from recouping the
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overpayments.
In finding manifest

injustice

in both cases, the court

accepted the argument that the potential for manifest injustice
must be evaluated in terms of the impact on the parties before them
and not on the basis of possible unfairness to third persons not
parties to the case.

Kramarevcky v. State, 822 P.2d at 1233.

Based on the fact that both Kramarevcky and Jinneman had provided
timely and accurate information to the state, the overpayment
stemmed from the state's error, there were no circumstances that
might have alerted the recipients to the fact of the overpayment
and both recipients lacked the resources to repay the debt without
drawing on funds needed to meet their most basic needs, the court
concluded:
[I]t would be manifestly unjust to require
persons with extremely limited resources and
income to take on the added burden of repaying
a debt incurred entirely without their
knowledge and acquiescence, solely through the
fault of the party against whom estoppel is
sought.
Kramarevcky v. State, DSHS, 822 P.2d at 1233.
The reasoning of the Washington court applies with equal force
in this case.

Barrus provided timely and accurate information to

her caseworker, starting in April 1994, from which the caseworker
knew,

or

should

have

known,

that

Barrus

would

receive

a

disqualifying lump sum in the near future. The caseworker's excuse
for not acting—that she needed to know the amount of the lump sum-is not acceptable.

The caseworker needed only to know that the

lump sum was DIB, which she could have learned by calling Social
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Security.

Even short of that information, she could have told

Barrus that a DIB lump sum would disqualify her children and,
therefore, when she received the lump sum to verify that it was, or
was not, DIB before spending it.

It is no excuse to say, as the

caseworker maintained in her testimony, that the state does not
tell recipients how to spend their money.

Barrus did not need to

be told how to spend her money; she needed only to be told how a
DIB lump sum would affect her eligibility.
The

overpayment

stemmed

from

the

state's

error.

The

caseworker was in the best position to understand how a DIB lump
sum would affect Barrus' eligibility. It is reasonable for an AFDC
recipient to infer that a state employee with graduate level
education

and

several

years

of

experience

is

competent

to

understand and communicate to her the difference between DIB and
SSI and how a lump sum will affect AFDC eligibility.

In fact, the

caseworker did know the difference but chose not to say anything
until after Barrus had received and spent the lump sum.

Such a

practice will inevitably result in overpayments, many of which are
likely to go unrecovered.

Those that are recouped from persons

living at or near the poverty level can only add to the burden of
poverty.
There were no circumstances under which Barrus might have
learned

that

her

caseworker

had

not

informed

her

properly

concerning her future eligibility as the state's own policies
required her to do.

Barrus testified she did not understand the

difference between the two programs—SSI and DIB. She made a good
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faith effort to find out from her caseworker how her children would
be affected but received either silence or misleading advice.
Barrus is impaired in her intellectual functioning, was trying to
deal with the added stress of caring for handicapped children and
could not be expected to have discovered on her own that her
children would be disqualified.
Barrus does not have the resources to repay the debt without
drawing on funds needed for basic needs. Barrus testified that she
spent the lump sum on a bed, phone bills, car tires and insurance
needed to make a trip to Oregon for a court appearance regarding
the children.

R-215.

Her husband was unemployed and she did not

have the means to repay the overpayment. R-218. Finally, like the
Kramarevcky case, there is no evidence from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn that Barrus sought to abuse the system. She
testified she had never been charged with fraud or an intentional
violation of the AFDC program and her consistent efforts to provide
her caseworker with information regarding her disability evidences
her sincerity.

Given all those facts, it would be a manifest

injustice to now allow the state to repudiate its representation
and

assert that she was overpaid.

D.

The Exercise of Governmental Powers Will Not be Impaired By
the Application of Equitable Estoppel
The

court

in

Kramarevcky

also

addressed

the

issue

of

impairment of governmental functions issue. It noted the relevance
of looking at public policy considerations in resolving the issue:
We consider relevant to this inquiry which
party could best have prevented the mistakes
that occurred and who is in the best position
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to assure that errors of this kind do not
occur.
Kramarevcky v. State. 822 P.2d at 1234.

It concluded that the

state could best have prevented the error and was in the better
position to prevent future errors.

It noted that the regulations

do not place the burden of determining eligibility on the recipient
and,
when all information is accurately and timely
provided by the recipient, it is appropriate
to put the burden on the government to assess
eligibility accurately in light of the
information provided.
Id. The functioning of the Washington DSHS would not be impaired,
the court reasoned, because the application of estoppel would
encourage it to "improve the accurate and orderly administration of
the entitlements system. . ." since the state office was in the best
position to review and revise its procedures to ensure that fewer
mistakes would be made in the future.

Id.

This court should adopt the reasoning of Kramarevcky in
addressing this element of applying equitable estoppel against the
government.

There is no dispute that Barrus provided accurate and

timely information to her state caseworker. The caseworker should
have been able to determine from that information that Barrus would
be receiving a disqualifying lump sum. To refuse to apply estoppel
would only encourage inefficient operation of the AFDC program,
since caseworkers will continue to remain silent, when a simple
explanation would avoid the creation of costly overpayments.

The

state is in the best position to prevent future overpayments of
this type by properly training its caseworkers on how to advise
26

recipients such as Barrus who have been found eligible for Social
Security disability benefits but do not know how that lump sum will
affect their children's eligibility for AFDC and medical benefits.
CONCLUSION
Barrus has satisfied all the elements of equitable estoppel.
The record demonstrates that her caseworker remained silent and
failed to comply with her duty to inform Barrus as to how her
eligibility would be affected by a DIB lump sum. Barrus relied on
that silence as a representation that she could spend the lump sum,
which she did.

It would now be a manifest injustice to allow the

state to repudiate its representation that the lump sum would not
affect her eligibility.

Such a holding would not impair the

functioning of the government but would encourage it to provide
timely and accurate information to recipients.

The court should

reverse the lower court and enter a decision estopping the state
from recovering any overpayment.
DATED this ,%[

day of July, 19<
r

Lchael E. Bulson
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINE L. BARRUS,
Petitioner,
vs.

]
]l

MEMORANDUM DECISION

]

STATE OF UTAH,
]
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,;)
Respondent.

Case No. 940900573

]

This case had its origin with a closure of petitioner's Aid to Families
With Dependant Children (AFDC) case for a period of two months based upon her
receipt of a Social Security disability lump-sum payment. The court finds that the
petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof and is not entitled to the petitioned
relief.
The basis for the petitioner's claim for payment from the state, is a
statement allegedly made to her by her case worker, that the social security payment
would not affect her ongoing AFDC assistance. Her allegation is that based upon that
representation she spent the lump sum payment. As a result, she and the children
would suffer if deprived of the AFDC assistance.
The legal theory upon which the petitioner's claim is based is one of
equitable estoppel. Under that doctrine she must prove that the statement was made,

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 940900573
Page 2
that she reasonably relied upon it, that an injury resulted, that manifest injustice would
result if not remedied, and that the remedy would not impair the function of
government.
The failure of the petitioner's case is based upon the court's finding that
the evidence failed to preponderate (let alone meet a standard of clear and convincing
evidence as required by applicable case law) on the issue of whether or not the
proported statement was made by Ms. Freestone (the AFDC caseworker).
I believe what may have happened was that the petitioner asked if her
AFDC would be affected by a lump sum SSI award, not recognizing the difference
between such an award and the SSA award that was actually made. A negative
response to that inquiry would have been factually correct, and Ms. Freestone could
not have been reasonably expected to know that the award actually to be made was
something different. Furthermore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would not require
the caseworker to make an independent investigation to determine if the petitioner was
asking the proper question.
Would the State's attorney please prepare the necessary findings,
conclusions and decree?
DATED this

0

day of February, 1996.

STANTON/M./TAYLOR, Judge

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 940900573
Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the y '
day of February, 1996, I sent a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision as follows:
Amy A. Jackson
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, UT 84118-0835
Michael E. Bulson
Utah Legal Services
Attorney for Defendant
550 24th Street #300
Ogden, UT 84401

Deputy Court/Clerk

(PL

AMY JACKSON #5724
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
P. 0. Box 140835
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835
Telephone: (801)538-9431
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
2549 WASHINGTON BLVD., OGDEN, UTAH 84401

CHRISTINE L. BARRUS,

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Department of Human Services,

]\
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
]
)
]1
]

Civil No.
Judge:

940900573
Taylor

Respondent.

This matter came on for trial on January 23, 1996, Michael Bulson, Utah Legal Services,
representing Ms. Barrus, and Amy Jackson, Assistant Attorney General, representing the State of
Utah. After reviewing the testimonies, evidence and briefs filed in the case, the court makes the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1)

This case originated with a closure of petitioner's AFDC case for a two-month period based

upon her receipt of a Social Security disability lump sum payment.
2)

The basis of the petitioner's claim for payment from the state is a statement allegedly made

to her by her caseworker that the social security payment would not affect her ongoing AFDC
assistance.
3)

Petitioner's allegation is that, based upon the caseworker's representation, she spent the lump

sum payment. She and her children were injured by closure of her AFDC case.
4)

Petitioner probably asked about the effect of her SSI award lump sum, not recognizing the

difference between such an award and the SSA award.
5)

The caseworker most likely responded correctly to a question about the SSI award's effect

on petitioner's AFDC case, and could not have been reasonably expected to know that the award
actually to be made was something different.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6)

The legal theory upon which petitioner's claim is based is one of equitable estoppel.

7)

Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, petitioner must prove that the statement was made,

that she reasonably relied upon it, that an injury resulted, that manifest injustice would result if the
injury were not remedied, and that the remedy would not impair the function of government.

2

8)

The evidence of whether or not the purported statement was made by the caseworker failed

to meet the clear and convincing standard as required by applicable case law.
9)

The doctrine of equitable estoppel would not require the caseworker to make an independent

investigation to determine if the petitioner was asking the proper question.
10)

Petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof and is not entitled to the relief prayed for

in her complaint.
Dated this

day of

, 199 .

STANTON M. TAYLOR, Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / £

day o^T^I^bc^^Uf

\99J$fl mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions oi Law, postage prepaid to Michael
E. Bulson, Utah Legal Services. 550 24th St. #300, Ogden, UT 84401.

/^4-^^^
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UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

04-92
BULLETIN OFS-11-92-04

GENERAL PROVISIONS - THE ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS

122Eliaibilitv Workers
1.

Roles:
Determine eligibility for temporary and appropriate benefits accurately
and timely; select from a wide variety of programs those necessary to
support clients in their efforts to become self sufficient.

2.

3.

Responsibilities
A.

Contact each client who applies.

B.

Provide information so each client can make informed decisions.

C.

Determine with the client which programs are applicable to her
circumstances.

D.

Explore strategies for overcoming barriers and assist the client to
obtain needed services.

E.

Make appropriate referrals to the self sufficiency worker and allied
agencies.

F.

Monitor and redetermine eligibility.

G.

Keep records which document eligibility and clients' movement
t o w a r d goals.

H.

Encourage and support appropriately.

Expectations:
A.

Use all skills, information, tools and resources available to assist
the client.

(Continued on Next Page)
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UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

04-92
BULLETIN OFS-11-92-04

GENERAL PROVISIONS - THE ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF
ELIGIBILITY WORKERS

4.

B.

Refrain from assuming responsibilities which belong to the client.

C.

Foster clients' ownership of her self sufficiency pathway.

D.

Refrain from making moral or personal judgements.

E.

Observe the rights of the client - refer to Section 110 for rights
of client.

F.

Safeguard information and protect confidentiality .

G.

Offer problem resolution opportunities.

Rights:
To keep professional and personal life separate. The professional
worker is not expected to be the best friend of the clients. Rather
the worker should be available to the clients in a professional setting.
In that setting, the relationship with the clients will be a
professional one.
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UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

06-95
BULLETIN OFS-ll-95-05

INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS
AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET
438

Lump Sum Payments and Other Income in Excess of Standard Needs Budget:
Lump sum payments, including (but not limited to) Social Security lump sums, VA
lump sums, unemployment compensation lump sums, and other one time payments
such as lottery winnings, severance pay and personal injury and worker
compensation awards, are considered lump sum income. Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) payments are NOT lump sum payments. Lump sums can be earned
or unearned income.
1.

If the net lump sum* is less than the Standard Needs Budget Figure it is to
be considered as income in the month received. Determine if it is countable
income by using the Best Estimate income rules found in Section 430. Any
remaining amount left the month following the month of receipt is considered
an asset.

2.

If a household's net countable income (including the net lump sum* payment)
exceeds the standard needs budget, then the amount in excess of the
standard needs budget will count as income for future months.

3.

All members included in the assistant unit will be ineligible for assistance for
the number of months determined by dividing the net countable income
received in the payment month by the standard need budget amount equal
to the assistant unit's size for the payment month. Any income remaining
from this calculation is counted as income in the first month following the
period of ineligibility.

* Net lump sum: That portion of a lump sum left after excluding:
1.
2.
3.

Legal fees expended in the effort to make the lump sum available AND
Payments for past medical bills AND
Funeral or burial expenses, if the lump sum was intended to cover funeral or burial
expenses.

Continued on the next page
438 Page 1

UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

10-92
BULLETIN OFS-ll-92-08

INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS
OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET

4.

A net lump s u m * payment that causes the net countable income to
exceed the standard budget will result in the case closure following the
procedures in Section 8 1 6 for a decrease in benefit. The ineligible period
for the household will begin the month the lumpsum is received. If due
to the 10 day notice requirement, a payment is made the month of
receipt or after the month of receipt of the lump sum, an overpayment
has occurred.
EXAMPLE:
Ms. A has net countable income of $50.00 received in January.
January she also received a lump sum of $ 2 , 7 5 0 .

In

She has a household of t w o with a standard budget of $ 4 3 1 . Determine
her period of ineligibility by adding the $50.00 net countable income to
the lump sum of $ 2 , 7 5 0 . This equals $2,800.
Divide $ 2 , 8 0 0 by the standard budget amount of $ 4 3 1 . 0 0 .
go into $ 2 , 8 0 0 six full times with a remainder of $214.

$431 will

Close the AFDC case at the end of January providing that you can give
adequate notice. If payment must be made in February, write an
overpayment for both January and February. The client is ineligible for
six months beginning w i t h January and ending w i t h June. If the client
reapplies in July, then the remainder of $214 will be added to any July
income she may have to determine eligibility for July and the initial grant
for July.
5.

A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received
before the date of application in the month of application, will result in
the application being denied and a period of ineligibility being determined.
If the case is ineligible, and the application is denied, then the month of
application is the first month in the period of ineligibility.

(Continued on Next Page)
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6.

A lump sum, in an amount greater than the standard budget, received
after the date of application in the month of application, will result in the
case being closed effective the last day of the month of application. If
payment must be made the next month, an overpayment for the
application month and the next month has occurred.

7.

Do not count a lump sum received before the month of application.

8.

A lump sum received after the month of closure shall not be counted nor
can it be used to extend the period of ineligibility.

9.

Treat new household members as a separate assistance unit if they meet
the 2 rules below:
A.

The new member is born or moves into the home after the lump
sum is received.
AND

B.

The new member was not included as part of the SNB used to
figure the period of ineligibility.

Do not use the lump sum income when determining eligibility and grant
amount.
Use all other household income. Include the income of
household members w h o are not eligible due to the receipt of the lump
sum.
The lump sum funds are not an asset for the new members. But, all other
household assets must be considered.
Use the figures from Table II for the number of new household members to
determine eligibility and the amount of payment. For example, if a child is born
after the period of ineligibility is calculated, base the grant for that child on a
household size of 1.
Beginning the month following the last month of ineligibility, aH family members
must be in one household. This rule applies even if there is an amount
remaining from the lump sum that is used as income.
438

Page 3

UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

04-93
BULLETIN OFS-ll-93-02

INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS
OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET
Shortening The Period Of Ineligibility

438-1

Shortening the Period of Ineligibility
1.

The period of ineligibility can be shortened only if one of
the following occurs.

A.

The State increases the Standard Needs Budget.

B.

The household incurs, becomes responsible for, and pays
medical expenses that are not covered by private insurance.
Only the following medical expenses can be used:

C.

(1)

Any expense that would be covered by the Medicaid
Program but is not because the household member
is not eligible for that program (see Table III,
Vol. Ill-F).

(2)

Any Chiropractic Service, Naturopathic Service, or
Pain Clinic Service.

(3)

Any paid prescriptions.

(4)

Co-payments made by Medicaid recipients
improper use of emergency room services.

for

A disaster occurs that results in the lump sum becoming
unavailable to the household for reasons beyond their
control. Examples include earthquake, fire, flood, robbery,
etc. The following conditions must be met:
(1)

The lump sum has been or will be spent in
connection with the disaster.

(Continued on next page)
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(2)

Until the disaster occurred, the lump sum was used
to provide food, clothing, or shelter.

(3)

The household has no other income or resources
sufficient to meet the expenses of the disaster.

The Regional Director or his designee must determine when a
disaster has occurred. Document the decision in the following
way:
A.

The Regional Director or his designee must write the
decision on Form 689.

B.

File the original copy of the 6 8 9 and all supporting
evidence in the case record.

C.

Send a copy of the 689 and all the supporting evidence to
the Director of the Office of Family Support.
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How to Recalculate the Period of Ineligibility
1.

If there is a change in the standard needs budget (SNB),
recalculate the period of ineligibility in the following way:
A.

B.

2.

Determine the amount of the lump sum that remains.
Do this in the following manner:
(1)

Multiply the old SNB by the number of months
the case has already been ineligible due to the
receipt of the lump sum.

(2)

Subtract this amount from the original net
countable income.
This is the amount
remaining.

Divide the amount remaining by the new SNB. this
is the number of months the household will remain
ineligible. Any amount left over will only count for
the month following the last month of ineligibility.

If the period of ineligibility is short need for any reason
other than a change in the SNB, calculate the new period
eof ineligibility in the following way:
A.

Multiply the SNB by the number of months the cas?
has already been ineligible due to the receipt of the
lump sum.

B.

Add the figure obtained in "a" to the amount paid for
medical expenses or lost due to a disaster.

(Continued on next page)
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C.

Subtract the amount obtained in " b " from the
original net countable income. This is the amount
remaining.

D.

If the amount remaining is zero, the soonest the
household is eligible is the date of the new
application.

B.

If the amount remaining is greater than zero but less
than the SNB, the soonest the household is eligible
is the date of the new application. The amount
remaining must be considered as income in the
month following the last month of ineligibility.

F.

If the amount remaining is greater than the SNB,
divide that amount by the SNB. This is the number
of months the household is ineligible. Any amount
remaining must count for the month following the
last month of ineligibility.
EXAMPLE:
In January the Jones household receives a lump sum
of $4100. The SNB is $400. If the ineligibility
period is not shortened, the Jones household will be
ineligible for 10 months, March through December.
However, in April Mr. Jones is hospitalized, and in
May he pays a $2000 hospital bill. The period of
ineligibility should be shortened. This is done by
following the steps below:
A.

Multiply SNB by 3.
$ 4 0 0 X 3 = $1200

(Continued on next page)
438-2 Page 2

UTAH-DHS-OFS
VOLUME II

1-92

INCOME STANDARDS - LUMP SUM PAYMENTS AND OTHER INCOME IN EXCESS
OF STANDARD NEEDS BUDGET
How To Recalculate The Period Of Ineligibility

B.

Add the $1200 to the medical bill that has
been paid.
$1200 + $2000 = $3200

C.

Subtract the $3200 from the amount of the
original lump sum.
$4100 - $3200 = $900

D.

Divide the $900 by the SNB.
$900 - $400= 2 with $100 left over.
The Jones household is ineligible for 2 more
months. They can apply again in August.
The $100 will be income for August.
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Lump Sums from Any Source Paid for an SSI Recipient in an
AFDC Household
Do not count the lump sum for an SSI recipient as either income
or resources.

438-3

except that the State may select categories of recipients who
may report at specified less frequent intervals; and
(B) that, in addition to whatever action may be appropriate
based on other reports or information received by the State
agency, the State agency will take prompt action to adjust the
amount of assistance payable, as may be appropriate, on the
basis of the information contained in the report (or upon the
failure of the family to furnish a timely report), and will give
an appropriate explanatory notice, concurrent with its action,
to the family;
(15) provide (A) for the development of a program, for each
appropriate relative and dependent child receiving aid under
the plan and for each appropriate individual (living in the same
home as a relative and child receiving such aid) whose needs
are taken into account in making the determination under
paragraph (7), for preventing or reducing the incidence of
births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening family life,
and for implementing such program by assuring that in all
appropriate cases (including minors who can be considered to
be sexually active) family planning services are offered to them
and are provided promptly (directly or under arrangements
with others) to all individuals voluntarily requesting such services, but acceptance of family planning services provided under the plan shall be voluntary on the part of such members
and individuals and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for
or the receipt of any other service under the plan; and (B) to
the extent that services provided under this paragraph are
furnished by the staff of the State agency or the local agency
administering the State plan in each of the political subdivisions of the State, for the establishment of a single organizational unit in such State or local agency, as the case may be,
responsible for the furnishing of such services;
(16) provide that the State agency will—
(A) report to an appropriate agency or official, known or
suspected instances of physical or mental injury, sexual
abuse or exploitation, or negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child receiving aid under this part under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is
threatened thereby; and
(B) provide such information with respect to a situation
described in subparagraph (A) as the State agency may
have;
(17) provide that if a child or relative applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children, or any other
744

person whose need the State considers wnen determining m^
income of a family, receives in any month an amount of earned
or unearned income which, together with all other income for
that month not excluded under paragraph (8), exceeds the
State's standard of need, applicable to the family of which he is
a member—
(A) such amount of income shall be considered income
to such individual in the month received, and the family of
which such person is a member shall be ineligible for aid
under the plan for the whole number of months that equals
(i) the sum of such amount and all other income received
in such month, not excluded under paragraph (8), divided
by (ii) the standard of need applicable to such family, and
(B) any income remaining (which amount is less than
the applicable monthly standard) shall be treated as income
received in the first month following the period of ineligibility specified in subparagraph (A);
except that the State may at its option recalculate the period of
ineligibility otherwise determined under subparagraph (A) (but
only with respect to the remaining months in such period) in
any one or more of the following cases: (i) an event occurs
which, had the family been receiving aid under the State plan
for the month of the occurrence, would result in a change in
the amount of aid payable for such month under the plan, or
(ii) the income received has become unavailable to the members of the family for reasons that were beyond the control of
such members, or (iii) the family incurs, becomes responsible
for, and pays medical expenses (as allowed by the State) in a
month of ineligibility determined under subparagraph (A)
(which expenses may be considered as an offset against the
amount of income received in the first month of such ineligibility);
(18) provide that no family shall be eligible for aid under the
plan for any month if, for that month, the total income of the
family (other than payments under the plan), without application of paragraph (8), other than paragraph (8)(A)(v) or
(8 2)(A)(viii), exceeds 185 percent of the State's standard of need
for a family of the same composition, except that in determining the total income of the family the State may exclude any
earned income of a dependent child who is a full-time student,
in such amounts and for such period of time (not to exceed 6
months) as the State may determine;
(19) provide—
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